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1 Habermas and Apel share with the 
wittgensteinian linguistic turn the main issue which is at 
stake in the latter. That is: they rely on the linguistical-
pragmatic substitution of the traditional Cartesian (and 
Kantian) subject of representation, thought as the non-
empirical and non-objective pre-condition of the possibility 
of the objective world, with the function of linguistic and 
communicative interaction as a means of subjective and 
intersubjective world-disclosure (H. Sluga 1996; 
Wittgenstein, Tlp, § 5.54- 5.55). The issue basically 
concerns the way we think about language as a system 
and a means of representation. What is here at stake is 
actually the source of its normativity, and the way in which 
this normativity can be rationally founded.  
For the two german philosophers, the link between 
linguistic reflection and the question of a normative rational 
foundation of philosophical research on practical reason, 
and of practical reason itself, is actually provided by the 
theoretical tradition they refer to. Especially Habermas has 
tried to structure his  reflections on the later Wittgenstein 
and on the pragmatization of linguistic turn (mostly by 
Austin and Searle) as a means to reconstruct the 
philosophical tradition of Critical Theory. This is the 
theoretical framework inside which Habermas and Apel 
attempt a criticism of late wittgensteinian theses. The 
question of the “authority of language” (Edwards 1990) 
thus becomes the pragmatic substitute of the question 
concerning the rational sources of the authority of practical 
and theoretical reason. Consequently, the question 
concerning the normative foundation of critical theory 
concerns the way inter-subjective obligation to such an 
authority can be thought as a function of the problem of 
subjective rational autonomy and self-reflexivity. The 
solution to this problem represents for Habermas and Apel 
a way of escaping from late Critical theory’s contradictions 
and of thinking of a non-instrumental and nonobjectivating 
reason.  
Inside this framework, the two philosophers’ 
reading of Wittgenstein is shaped by the need of rescuing 
the consensual feature of the latter quasi-conventionalist 
approach while escaping from what they think of as a form 
of anti-normative relativism and contextualism. Their 
criticism of  the Philosophical investigations’ theses is 
based on two main points. The first concerns the question 
of incommunicability between linguistic games, and the 
real meaning of Wittgenstein’s “pluralism” (Apel 1972). The 
second, strictly related, concerns the foundation question, 
that is: the question of the representability of the source of 
normative representation.  
Both Habermas and Apel take the latter issue as 
fundamental for the needs of a critical social theory. They 
see in the later Wittgenstein a radically anti-normative 
approach to the question of the self-reflexivity of inter-
subjective obligation to linguistic and pragmatic rules. Their 
criticism of this point rests on a conception of rational 
practical autonomy as based on the capacity and 
possibility to transcend every factual - empirical obligation 
to authority by appeal to a higher ideal authority (i.e. 
Habermas 1967, pp. 90 ff.; 1971 pp. 67 ff.; 1981, pp. 412 
ff). What is here important is in fact how this transcending 
is thought, and the kind of philosophical justification the 
higher authority can claim to rest on. Such a justification is 
identified, both by Habermas and Apel, with the idealist 
feature of linguistic worlddisclosure. The idealism here 
concerns the interpretation and criticism of the late 
wittgensteinian notion of an intersubjective consensus as 
central to the determination of meaning inside the 
systematical framework of language as a social praxis 
(Habermas 1982; Apel 1972). We shall start our analysis 
from this second point.  
What is here at stake is the pragmatic meaning of 
this consensus, that is: the pragmatic level of judgments 
and justifications rather than the semantic question of 
meaning. The link between the two is obviously given by 
the identification of language with a social praxis (PU, § 
51, 202, 560; BlB, pp. 5, 61; BF, III 317), and the definition 
of linguistic rules as constitutive of this praxis. Habermas 
and Apel assume this link to be constitutive of the 
normativity of language in a way antithetical to 
Wittgenstein’s.  
The latter’s notion of “linguistic game” highlights, 
against the main assumptions of the Tractatus,  the 
contingency and the conventional character of the 
normative rule system by which the meaning depends. As 
it is well known, Wittgenstein now gives up the idea of a 
system of possible meanings as a closed and definitively 
fixed horizon, and the attribution of the normative feature 
of language to the fact of mirroring empirical reality. The 
central notions of rule following and rule-sharing are in turn 
based on the conventional and arbitrary character of the 
inter-subjective consensus on which they rely ( PG, § 133; 
WWK, p. 93; Z, § 357). The social consensus sustaining 
the systematic character of language (that is: language as 
a system of rules by which in turn significant differences 
can be defined), is therefore the source of a factual 
normativity that seems not to be able to transcend itself 
(Kripke 1982, pp. 15 ff. and 27-49). The later 
Wittgenstein’s “full blooded conventionalism” (Dummett 
1978) confers a purely empirical value to the linguistic role, 
played by its consensual structure, of world-disclosure. 
This means that the pre-empirical, and quasi-
transcendental, condition of experience of empirical world 
is in fact factual and practical, though not representable 
but only shown by the practice of speaking and 
understanding. Wittgenstein argues here against any kind 
of foundationalism. 
This in turn explains the notion of pluralism, which 
especially attains to the source of normativity. There is no 
“source”, or “essence” of language, but a plurality of levels 
of linguistic organization of reality; there is no meta-
language thinkable as a way of selfthematization of its 
normative structure (i.e. PU § 108). The whole structure of 
philosophical representation is in fact revisited: the 
normativity of statements, practical and theoretical, is a 
function of a pre-determining factual condition of factuality. 
This is what Habermas calls a social reflexivity of 
language, which is in no way a social self-reflexivity of the 
inter-subjective obligation to rules. 
Habermas and Apel argue against Wittgenstein’s 
conventionalism and its consequent contextualist 
development, for which no communication between 




different linguistic games seems to be possible, by a two-
step move. Against the conventionalist and purely factual 
character of social consensus they argue for a normative 
foundation showing a necessary character. The status of 
this necessity is in fact, as we shall se, controversial, for 
Habermas and Apel seem to appeal both to a logical 
necessity and to an artificial moral necessity (identified 
with the “emancipating character of modern reason”) (Apel 
1972, pp. 203 ff.; Habermas 1985). In any case, both refer 
to the notion of a performative contradiction in order to 
define the necessity of thinking of the inter-subjective 
consensus framing the social praxis of speaking and 
understanding as an idealist world disclosure in which and 
through which the function of world-disclosure can be 
defined as the locus of autonomy and equality of speaking-
subjects. They both think to the communicative function of 
language as prominent, and attribute to an ideal 
communicative situation the role that Wittgenstein 
attributed to social consensus, with a surplus of (ethical, 
neither logical nor empirical) normativity given by the 
inescapable character of its emancipating features. 
Emancipation is here identified with the form of context-
transcendence made possible by the meta-language of 
equal and free inter-subjectivity. In this framework, 
autonomy is precisely freedom from established 
conventions, and the way in which this freedom actually 
becomes operative is the structuring of communication as 
argumentation. Against Wittgenstein’s idea that the limit of 
reasons is given by the boundaries of my linguistic game, 
they postulate the necessity of a universal, normative 
“game of games” through which an idealist version of 
linguistic interaction is rescued. They take his meta-game 
to be the practice of discussion in ideal factual conditions, 
and think of it as playing a rule of self-justification (thus, of 
justification of the very criteria of justification). Consensus 
resulting from the practice of arguing and justifying in ideal 
conditions is then identified with the normative structure of 
communicative world disclosure. This normative structure 
is said to be necessary in virtue of the fact that any attempt 
to enter the communicative-argumentative game cannot 
bypass the rules of equality, freedom and inclusion 
recognized for every member of the communication 
community. Wittgenstein’s attempt to reduce the Sollen to 
a Sein is here rehearsed.  
The second step is given by the statement of the 
universal character of such a game of games. From this 
viewpoint, the necessity of postulating a game of games 
(which Apel identifies with the linguistic game of 
philosophical argumentation; Apel 1976, 1997.) is stated 
as a function of the factual possibility of universal, (non-
contextual) criticism. The link between the pragmatic and 
the semantic dimension is here fully explicit: Habermas 
and Apel argue for the existence of a point of  view, at 
once internal and external to every linguistic game, by 
which translation and argumentation is in any case 
possible. This is in fact the very possibility of thinking of the 
dialectics between performativity and objectivity as 
structuring the practice of communication. Wittgenstein’s 
pluralism of language-games, thus the recognition of a 
plurality of levels of representation, is indirectly denied. 
The denial is actually a result of postulating the pre-
determination of linguistic-communicative practices by a 
normative quasi-transcendental framework which 
structures the interactive praxis without being structured by 
it. 
 
2 What is here carried out is a deep revision of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of language and language use 
as conventionally determining the level of linguistic-rational 
representation. That is: the whole idea of the dependence 
of the normative structure from interactive practices which 
do exhaust themselves in the normative framework of their 
communicative recognition. I think that this revision can be 
defined in terms of  an attempt to install a Kantian notion of 
rationality and autonomy inside the framework of the 
linguistic turn. Both Habermas and Apel recognize this; 
Apel explicitly speaks of a “semiotization of Kantianism”. 
The idealist turn through which Wittgenstein is interpreted 
directly refers to a process of linguistic-pragmatic reading 
of the classical continental conception of representation. 
The aporias and misunderstandings of this reading seem 
to depend on such an operation. 
Habermas and Apel inherit from the Kantian notion 
of practical autonomy a fundamental feature. That is: 
practical individual autonomy comes to be identified with 
the capacity of transcending the context by appealing to a 
normative universal rational form. This is basically an 
appeal to a universal thought as normative and necessary 
in virtue of its being  at once the prius and the posterius of 
rational representation. The Kantian conception of practical 
reason, especially as it is exposed in the Foundation of the 
metaphysics of customs, relies on the teleological and 
tautological function of the notion of “universality” of 
reason. The abstraction from contextual ends and means 
is the necessary precondition of practical autonomy, as it is 
clear from the very concept of  “practical (good) will”. This 
abstraction is in turn the result of a formalistic and 
teleological conception of practical reason. Thus the very 
structure of obligation to practical norms (and especially of 
obligation to the categorical imperative) depends on the 
universality of the form as at once means and end of  
context-transcending (FMS, § 398, 421, 429,444, etc.).  
The idealist framework of Habermas’ and Apel’s 
conception of communicative autonomy actually replies the 
Kantian assumption that central  for the individual being 
autonomous and self-reflexive is its capacity to assume the 
transcendental point of view of rational universality as the 
form and content of his will. The idealistic pre-
determination is thus made possible by the objective 
subsistence of a quasi-metaphysical framework which in 
turn is neutral to every empirical determination of the will. 
Its neutrality, which Habermas assumes as the main 
feature of the communicative-universal point of view, thus 
of the game of games represented by the ideal speech 
situation, is in fact ethically shaped. Apel takes this ethical 
direction to be that of a “universal history” of  
communication and translation.  
The Kantian conception of transcendental and 
formalistic normativity of practical reason is clearly not 
compatible with the wittgensteinian refusal of any a-priori 
determination of the structure-essence of (linguistic) 
representation. The “final” point of view of justification, 
given in Kantian metaphysics by the “kingdom of ends” as 
the possibility condition of autonomy, is actually antithetical 
to the main assumptions of the Philosophical 
investigations. The illusion of an a-priori universal and 
normative point of view must here clearly be denied. Does 
this mean that one has deny any possibility of a non-
relativistic reading and development of late wittgensteinian 
ideas? 
 
3 We must here come back for a moment to 
Wittgenstein’s notion of incommunicability 
(incommensurability) between linguistic games, which is 
directly related to the question of autonomy as a capacity 
to transcend the given conventional context. The notion is 
interpreted by Habermas and Apel in terms of a profession 
of full-blooded relativism, and said to be meaningless in 
virtue of the factual operativity of translation.  




In fact, what Wittgenstein is here saying concerns 
another level, at which this criticism seems not to be 
reasonable. It concerns precisely the level of normative 
judgment, at which no neutral point of view is possible. The 
point of view (that is to say: the criteria of judgment), is 
thought of as necessarily internal to a linguistic game. The 
plurality of linguistic games being the plurality of levels of 
representation, thus of organization of reality, the issue is 
here given by the incommensurability of paradigmatic pre-
conceptions of reality and of the same inter-subjective 
reading of it. This does not means that a judgment is not 
possible; it only means that a neutral, super-partes position 
is an illusion. However, in the PU, we are faced with the 
game of imagining linguistic games different from ours 
(PU, § 299; see also Z, § 350). I think that what actually 
makes this imagination game possible is precisely the 
consciousness that the criteria of the game are in some 
way “biased”. Wittgenstein is certainly not interested in 
transforming the practice of linguistic criticism into an 
emancipating practice. However, he speaks about the 
“imagination game” as a way of  acquiring consciousness 
and a better degree of understanding of our concepts and 
paradigmatic assumptions ( VB, p.141).  
This acquisition of consciousness seems to 
highlight the basis of a possible redefinition of the classical 
concept of autonomy, in terms of a capacity of 
understanding the genealogy of our paradigmatical 
framework of reference’s features. Starting from the 
participative character of such an understanding, and from 
the assumption that the very recognition of family 
resemblances between linguistic games is in turn based on 
what “all men have in common”, that is: on features and 
criteria recognizable from a point of view much “lower” 
than that postulated by Habermas and Apel, that the notion 
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